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Ahmed Draia University-Adrar
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Department of English Language and Literature



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Anglophone Literature and Civilization entitled:

The American-Barbary Wars 1801-1816

Candidate:

Mr.LAKHDAR Larbi

The Jury:

Supervisor: Pr. BORSALI Fewzi

President: Mr. Abidi Abdelwahid

Examiner: Miss.Kerthiou Omayma

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Dedication

I dedicate this humble work to my dearest wife "*Green Purity*", my daughter Alaa Zohra, and my son Haythem.

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Abstract

Wars that flare between one country and another are mainly due to the oppressive policies applied on the weakest country. However, the constant oppression leads a country first, to subdue, then, to resist and to fight back when obtaining power. The American- Barbary wars 1801-1816 are a clear example for the oppressive policies that the Barbary States practiced on the United States. After the independence, American ships were unable to sail in the Mediterranean Sea due to the piratical practices of the Barbary States. But the United States could build a strong navy by which she could overwhelm these states and achieve supremacy in the waters.

Keywords: Barbary States, United States, Wars, Supremacy, Diplomacy, Foreign Relationship, Peace Treaty, Ottoman Empire, Mediterranean Piracy – Early U.S Foreign Policy, Empire, U.S – Algerian, Tunis, Morocco and Tripoli Relations.

المخلص

إن الحروب التي تندلع بين بلد وآخر سببه الرئيسي راجع إلى السياسات القمعية و الظلم الممارس ضد الدول الضعيفة. ومع ذلك ، فإن الاضطهاد المستمر يقود هذا البلد الضعيف أولاً إلى الخضوع و بعد ذلك للمقاومة و شن الحرب عند إكتساب القوة. الحروب الأمريكية البربرية 1801-1816 هي مثال واضح للسياسات القمعية التي مارسها الولايات البربرية على الولايات المتحدة. بعد استقلال الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية من بريطانيا لم تتمكن سفنها من عبور البحر الأبيض المتوسط بسبب ممارسة القرصنة للدول البربرية في البحر , لكن الولايات المتحدة استطاعت أن تبني أسطول بحري قوي الذي من خلاله أستطاعت مجابهت هذه الولايات البربرية و فرض سيادتها في البحر الابيض المتوسط.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الولايات البربرية ، الولايات المتحدة ، الحروب ، التفوق ، الدبلوماسية ، العلاقات الخارجية ، معاهدة السلام ، الإمبراطورية العثمانية ، القرصنة المتوسطية - السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية ، الإمبراطورية ، العلاقات الأمريكية الجزائرية ، التونسية ، المغربية والليبية.

Resumé

Les guerres qui éclatent d'un pays à l'autre sont principalement dues aux politiques oppressives appliquées au pays le plus faible. Cependant, l'oppression constante amène d'abord un pays à se soumettre, puis à résister et à se défendre lorsqu'il obtient le pouvoir. Les guerres américano-barbares de 1801 à 1816 illustrent clairement les politiques oppressives que les États de Barbarie ont appliquées aux États-Unis. Après l'indépendance, les navires américains n'ont pas pu naviguer en Méditerranée à cause des pratiques piratées des États de Barbarie. Mais les États-Unis pourraient construire une marine forte qui leur permettrait de submerger ces États et d'atteindre la suprématie dans les eaux.

Mots-clés: États barbares, États-Unis, guerres, suprématie, diplomatie, relations étrangères, traité de paix, empire ottoman, piraterie en Méditerranée - début de la politique étrangère américaine, empire, États-Unis - Relations entre l'Algérie, Tunis, le Maroc et Tripoli.

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General Introduction

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, several naval wars broke out in the Mediterranean Sea between European, American and North African powers. Each country of these powers aimed at subduing its rivalry so as to protect its interests. These interests varied according to valuable resources that could enrich the country's treasury in order to build a strong navy, develop the country and more importantly to remain supreme over the other countries.

During the seventeenth century, the North African Barbary States had the supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea over European countries through raiding their ships which were regarded as the main source to their financial incomes. Despite the fact that the Barbary States faced a strong friction and disagreement with some of these European countries in the eighteenth century, they continued controlling the Mediterranean Sea and carrying on raiding other nations' ships among which was the United States.

The United States before independence was regarded a new British colony for the Barbary States. Britain was in charge of all American relations with the Barbary States. American ships had never encountered harassments in the Mediterranean due to the British equal supremacy with the Barbary States. However, after the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), the Barbary States' relations with the newly independent nation had completely changed.

Between 1770s and the 1790s, the Barbary States' powers kept their supremacy over the Mediterranean Sea by forcing the United States to pay money to protect her ships in the waters because she had no power of her own. Thus, the United

States acquiesced to Barbary States' humiliating orders. So as to strengthen her position worldwide and to prove her supremacy over North African corsairs, the United States decided to defend herself.

The United States engaged in two consecutive wars from 1801 to 1816 in order not to subdue to the Barbary States' supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea. To give more explanation about these two wars, the first chapter of the dissertation is set as a historical background for the early relations of the Barbary States with the European countries and the United States. It also shows the factors that led the United States to go to war with the Barbary States. Most of the important events that happened during the United States' war with the Barbary States are highlighted in the second chapter. This chapter also explains the strategies used by both states.

Chapter I:

The Early Barbary States' Relations with the European Countries and the United States from 1600 to 1800.

Introduction

Between 1801 and 1816, two wars flared between the United States of America and the Barbary States in the Mediterranean Sea. These wars cannot be understood unless relations of the Barbary States with some European countries and the United States before this period are explored. In addition, the main factors leading to wars should be clarified.

A short description of the Barbary States such as their location, composition and the percentage of their population are discussed in the first section. Politically, this section will give an overview of the governmental organization of these states, in addition to their internal and foreign policies. Concerning the foreign policies of the Barbary States, the first section focuses on the attempts of the European countries such as Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Britain to face Barbary States' threats to protect their interests in the Mediterranean Sea.

A. The Barbary States' Construction and their early Foreign Relations

The Barbary States 'corsairs had special relations with some European countries and the United States. Before listing these relations, it is preferable to give illustrations about the Barbary States' construction.

A.1. The Barbary States' Location and Inhabitants.

The Barbary States were located in the North African coast. These states consisted of Tangier, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli which are the northern cities of

Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli states respectively.¹ These were named the Barbary States by the Europeans in the 16th century due to the fact that North African lands were inhabited by Berber people who were living on piracy in the coastal areas in the Mediterranean Sea and the North Eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean.²

During the eighteenth century, the population of the Barbary States also comprised Turks, Arabs, Moors, and Jews.³ The Turks were more powerful politically than the other groups though they were few in number. Jews constituted a minority and were segregated and treated with contempt under Muslim rulers.⁴

Some historians estimated the population of the four Barbary States on the basis of some letters and reports that were sent by some European and American consuls and officers who were appointed in the Barbary States. An English officer who served in Morocco by the beginning of the eighteenth century reported that there were no more than two million inhabitants in that state. In Algiers, in 1796, United States' agent Joel Barlow sent a letter to the Secretary of State in which he indicated that there were between two and three million people there. In another report, the Tunis population was estimated to be larger than the city of Algiers, whereas Tripoli had the least population among the three.⁵

The Barbary States' corsairs were grouped in the North African coastal area from west to east as it is shown in map one. These coastal areas extended over a

¹ "Barbary Coast." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 19 Mar. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbary_Coast. Accessed on 13 April 2019.

² Ágoston, Gábor and Masters, Bruce. *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*. Facts on File, Inc. 2009.p. 221

³ W. Irwin, Ray. *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers*. Chapel Hill, 1931. p.4


⁴ Daly, Robert W. *Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Coast, 1790-1801*. MA Thesis. Loyola University Chicago, 1940.p. 2.

⁵ W. Irwin 6.

distance of 2,000 miles.⁶ This strategic location enabled them to control the Mediterranean Sea and to attack unarmed coastal towns in Spain, Italy and Greece.⁷

⁶ Chidsey, Donald Barr. *The Wars in Barbary, Arab Piracy and the Birth of the United States Navy*. Crown Publishers. New York, 1971. p.1

⁷ Davis, Robert. C. *Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast*. *Past & Present*, vol. 172, no. 1, 2001, pp. 87–124., doi:10.1093/past/172.1.87. Accessed: 17-04-2019 . p.116



The Barbary States' Location

Source: Conservapedia. Barbary_States.png (Image PNG, 833 × 372 pixels). <http://www.conservapedia.com>.28January2009.2019.http://www.conservapedia.com/images/b/b5/Barbary_States.png Accessed on 13 April

A.2. The Political Organization of the Barbary States.

In the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire controlled the North African coast.⁸ The rule of this Empire started in this area when the two Barbarossa brothers Khayreddine (1483-1546) and Uruj (1474-1518) feared their execution by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I who wanted to get rid of Sultan Bayezid's son, Sultan Korkud and his followers in 1513. As a result, the two brothers fled to North Africa. They established themselves as pirates and later on they were appointed as Ottoman governors in the Ottoman provinces Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers by Sultan Selim I's son, Sultan Suleiman I. The North African provinces were renamed Ottoman regencies by successive Sultans.⁹

The Turkish Sultans were unable to control the Sultanate of northern Morocco because it was under the Alawi, the prophet descendant dynasty for the Alawite rulers were stronger than the Ottoman ruling family. Thus, they resisted the Ottoman political expansion in north Morocco.¹⁰

The Ottoman authorities in Constantinople, the capital of Turkey, nominated in each Barbary state a ruler who could manage on the behalf of the Sultan. In Algiers, the ruler was titled "Dey", in Tunis "Bey", and in Tripoli "Pasha" or "Bashaw".¹¹ In the independent sultanate of north Morocco the ruler was titled Emperor.¹²

Shortly after appointing these rulers, political ties between the Turkish Sultans and the North African regencies' rulers started to regress. It was due to the

⁸ Janssens, Jean- Claude. *The Barbary Wars 1801-1805 and 1815, the First Operations of the US Navy in the Mediterranean Sea*. Belgium Historians, 2017. p. 1

⁹ Imber, Colin. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 the Structure of Power*. Palgrave Macmillan: 2002.p. 48

¹⁰ Ágoston & Masters 439.

¹¹ Chidsey 2.

¹² Woodward, G. Thomas. "The Costs of State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Example of the Barbary Pirates." *National Tax Journal*, vol. 57, no. 3, 2004, pp. 599–611., doi:10.17310/ntj.2004.3.07.p.600. Accessed 25.04.2019.

long distance between North Africa and Turkey and the primitive means of communication that made the mission impossible for these Sultans to manage both their states and North Africa.¹³ Subsequently, the Barbary rulers found themselves isolated receiving no instructions from the “Sublime Porte”¹⁴ in Turkey. They began to manage autonomously and set up their regencies as states. Thus, when Turkey no longer appointed rulers, the Barbary governors started to succeed one another in ruling the state.¹⁵ The succession of power in the Barbary States was merely built upon conspiracies like coups and violence so as one regime abolished the other.¹⁶

The Barbary States' rulers appointed dignitaries as commanders at the head of the ground army. They had a strong position as delegates in the state. These men were known as Agas, Kiaya, and Bey in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli respectively. The Agas in Algiers were assisted by Janissaries and bodyguards. In Tunis, the Kiaya would get the support of a second Kiaya and in Tripoli Bash Mamlukes were assistants to the Bey.¹⁷

The armed forces of Tripoli were composed of Kuloghilus (sons of Turkish janissaries and native women) and Arabs. Tunis' armed force included a militia of janissaries of eight thousand men at the end of the eighteenth century. Unlike Tripoli and Tunis, the Odjak in Algiers was the militia which represented the major part of armed forces. It consisted of eight to ten thousand men who were mostly local people and renegades who had turned from Christianity to Islam.¹⁸

¹³ Barnes, Gregory Fremont. *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates, to the Shores of Tripoli: the Rise of the US Navy and Marines*. Osprey Publishing. p.16

¹⁴ The Central Government of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁵ Manis, Iii Brett A. *Free to Beg or to Fight: Thomas Jefferson and Relations with Barbary, 1785-1805*. MA Thesis. University Oklahoma City, 2006. Web. 22 Oct 2018. p. 28

¹⁶ Barnes 16.

¹⁷ Panzac, Daniel. *The Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800-1820*. Brill Academic Publishers, 2004. p.14

¹⁸ Panzac 20.

A.3. The Internal Policy of the Barbary States.

The Dey of Algiers, the Bey of Tunis and the Bashaw of Tripoli managed their states by appointing a group of trusted men who were called by the French "Puissance" (Powers). These men's role was to look after military and civil affairs of their states.¹⁹

The judicial issues were managed by *Sahib At-Tabaa*, the seals keeper. He was assisted by *Bash k̄atib*, the head clerk, who was concerned with the relations between the provincial *Kaids* and foreign states. The Clerk's job was to register records of decisions, accounts, and the states' customs. All these official figures were living in the city of states.²⁰

Financially, man called *Khaznadji* was appointed to manage the States' treasuries. So as to get revenues to the state's treasury, the man in power established an administrative management of the city and the hinterlands of his state to impose taxes on Arabs, Berbers, Moors, Turks, and Jews by using a small garrison called the *Mehalla* which visited the areas once a year. To simplify the mission of tax collection, each state was divided into three zones. Each zone had a governmental representative called *khojet El-Kheil*, and *Kaid* who were also in charge of receiving the horses from the heads of the inland tribes to use them in wars. All the taxes and the supplies collected from these zones were stored so as to separate them according to the state's usage. A share of these supplies would be sent to the sultans in the Sublime Porte. In fact, each ruler's period in the Barbary States depended on how much provisions he could amass, the longer he could remain in power.²¹ Also, the Barbary ruler would get

¹⁹ Panzac 14.

²⁰ Panzac 14.

²¹ Lardas, Mark *.Decatur's Bold and Daring Act, the Philadelphia in Tripoli 1804.* Osprey Publishing.2011. p.7

extra privileges from the Ottoman Sultan in power. With these privileges, the ruler could create a more powerful local dynasty with a strong military force.²²

The military force called the Janissaries was serving in the three Barbary States. The Janissaries were recruited officially by the Sultan of the "Sublime Porte" to exert pressure in these states. Their function was to control commerce, and for this purpose not only the fleets but also the whole state was organized. Those soldiers' existence in Tripoli and Tunis was important; however, in Algiers it was very essential. There were about 10,000 professional Janissaries in Algiers which made it the strongest and the most dangerous nest of pirates.²³

North Morocco in the seventeenth century was ruled under the *Alawite* Emperor who established his capital at *Meknes*. He created a central administration and a suitable taxation system to manage the sultanate economy. The Emperor also established a Janissary-like national army of slaves called Black Guards who were loyal to the person of the emperor.²⁴

The independent sultanate of north Morocco suffered from internal problems due to the endless disputes among local rulers. When the *Alawite* dynasty came to power, they limited the excessive powers of these local rulers and restored the sultanate's political unity.²⁵

²² Faroqhi, Suraiya. *Approaching Ottoman History, an introduction to the Sources*. Cambridge, 2004.p.116

²³ Panzac 17.

²⁴ "Alaouite Dynasty." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 18 May 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaouite_dynasty. Accessed on 20 March 2019.

²⁵ "Dynasty.", "Alawite. "Alawite Dynasty." *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, Encyclopedia.com, 2019, www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/alawite-dynasty. Accessed on 24 May. 2019

A.4. The Navy

The maritime forces of the four Barbary States were instituted for no other purpose except for piracy. There were records which give approximate details for the formulation of the four Barbary States. These records were written by delegates, messengers and consuls and even prisoners from European countries like Britain and the United States. In 1797, a delegate called John Lamb was sent by the United States to Algiers. He wrote to Thomas Jefferson who was the Vice President under the presidency of John Adams that Algiers fleets were composed of nine "xebecs"²⁶ equipped with 8 to 36 guns; the largest was powered with 400 men. The commander of the navy in Algiers was known as *Wakil al-Kharj*.²⁷

An English officer who served as a diplomat in Morocco wrote that the Moroccan navy consisted of twenty warships, the largest contained twenty guns. In 1799, the American consul in Tunis William Eaton reported that the Tunisian naval force consisted of ninety-four armed warships with nine hundred and twenty-eight guns. In 1800, the consul of Tripoli declared that the Bashaw had a maritime force of eleven warships equipped with more than a hundred guns. In Tripoli and Tunis, the commanders of the navy were known as *Rais El-Bahr*.²⁸

A.5. The External Policy of the Barbary States

Piracy in the Mediterranean Sea shaped external policy. Raiding on ships and expropriating both people and commodities was regarded as an essential source for survival for the corsairs. Though some European countries and the United States found trading worldwide lucrative through crossing the Mediterranean, they were

²⁶ A small three-masted Mediterranean sailing ship with lateen and sometimes square sails.

²⁷ Panzac 14.

²⁸ W. Irwin 7.

unable to carry this activity at ease. This was due to the Barbary corsairs' dominating threat therein.²⁹

After few centuries of Muslim rule in Spain, Christians attacked and took control over Granada in 1492 which led Muslims to flee to North of Africa. This attack created tension among Muslims who decided to join pirates in order to get revenge³⁰. As a result, the number of Barbary pirates increased considerably and to put an end to the escalation of these corsairs, several military and naval expeditions were sent by European countries like Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Britain to attempt to restrain the maritime activity of these pirates.³¹ But in front of the increasing threat of the Barbary pirates, the European countries had to think of either making peace with them or embarking in war. In fact, each European country elaborated a policy towards the Barbary pirates.³²

As far as Spain is concerned, and following the fall of Muslims rule in Spain, the Castilian King Ferdinand, ruler of Spain sought to conquer the North African coastal territory in 1497.³³ He was able to occupy some Moroccan lands such as Melilla, (Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera)³⁴. He could take Algiers (Mazalquivir)³⁵ in 1505, Oran in 1509, (Bougie)³⁶ and Tripoli in 1510. During the clash between the Spanish troops and the North African inhabitants, an estimated number of 10,000

²⁹ Panzac 14.

³⁰ Goodin, Brett. *Opportunities of Empire : Three Barbary Captives and American Nation-Building, 1770-1840*. PhD Thesis. Australian National University, 2015. Web. 11 Feb 2019. p. 2

³¹ Wheelan, Joseph. *Jefferson's War, America's First War on Terror 1801-1805*. Carroll & Graf Publishers. New York. 2003. p.22

³² Gøbel, Erik. "The Danish 'Algerian Sea Passes', 1747-1838: An Example of Extraterritorial Production of 'Human Security' / Die 'Algerischen Seepässe' Dänemarks, 1747-1838: Ein Beispiel Der Extraterritorialen Produktion Humaner Sicherheit." *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, vol. 35, no. 4 (134), 2010, pp. 164–189. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/25758863. p.165

³³ King, Major David M. *United States Joint Operations in the Tripolitan Campaign of 1805, USA*. MA Thesis. University of California, Berkeley, 1981. Web. 12 Nov 2018. p.11

³⁴ *Jazirat Ghumara* is a Spanish rock (*plaza de soberanía*) and tied island in the west of the Mediterranean Sea, connected to the Moroccan shore by a sandy isthmus.

³⁵ Mers El Kébir "The Great Harbor" is a port on the Mediterranean Sea, near Oran in Oran Province, northwest Algeria.

³⁶ Bougie and Bugia, is a Mediterranean port city on the Gulf of Béjaïa in Algeria.

Muslims were killed and some others were captured. Oran became a Spanish naval base equipped with cannons and arquebusiers after killing the third of its Muslim population. This mission was carried under the Cardinal Cisneros who also turned two mosques into Catholic churches³⁷.

As a reaction to the Spanish invasion, by the beginning of the 16th century the Ottomans decided to put an end for the Spanish domination in the North African coast from Tangiers in the west to Tripoli in the east.³⁸ The two brothers Aruj (1474-1518) and Khayreddine (1483-1546) were able to organize corsairs' fleets to take as many Spanish ships as they could.³⁹ In 1516, equipped with 5000 men and cannons, Aruj seized Algiers after deposing the representative of King Ferdinand in this area. But Aruj did not remain in power because he was killed with his 1500 men by Charles II in 1518 who sent 10,000 troops to fight the Barbarossa brothers' power in Algiers. Shortly afterwards, Khayreddine succeeded his brother and got support from Sultan Selim I, who in turn provided him with 2,000 men and appointed him Governor-General of Algiers, which enabled him later to retake the "Penon de Alger"⁴⁰. Actually, it was due to the Turks' backup in exchange for tribute and loyalty that piracy in North Africa increased on the coastal areas.⁴¹ In 1534, Khayreddine could recover other towns in the Barbary States of Tunis and Tangier and ruling them both on behalf of the Ottoman sultan⁴².

³⁷ "Spanish Empire." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 23 May 2019,

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Empire#Campaigns_in_North_Africa. Accessed 16 April 2019.

³⁸ Salzmann, Ariel. *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire Rival Paths to the Modern State*. Brill Leiden. Boston. 2004 .p.47

³⁹ Ágoston & Masters 77.

⁴⁰ Peñón of Algiers was a small islet off the coast of Algiers, fortified by the Kingdom of Spain during the 16th century. The islet was connected to the African continent to form a seawall and the harbour of Algiers.

⁴¹ Bradford, Alfred S. *Flying the Black Flag a Brief History of Piracy*. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut London, 2007. p.124-125

⁴² Erasmus, Roel Monsieurs. *The Causes and Consequences of the First Barbary War 1801-1805*. MA Thesis. University Rotterdam, 2016. Web. 05 Feb 2019.p. 30

As to Portugal's policy towards the Barbary States, the Portuguese attempts to protect themselves or to control the increasing threats of the Barbary pirates and to dominate some of their coastal areas were undertaken in 1437. Portugal could put footholds on the city of Tangier. Portugal remained for two centuries in that area profiting of its resources.⁴³ However, the presence of the Portuguese in Tangier was disturbed owing to constant conflicts between its army and the Moors. Consequently, Portugal decided to get rid of the city of Tangiers through granting it to England as a marriage gift to the Portuguese princess Catherine with Charles II in 1662, but in 1684, the Moors could re-control their city again.⁴⁴

With respect to France's policy with the Barbary States, the French vessels were an easy prey to capture by the Barbary corsairs. So as to get back these vessels, France signed a treaty with Morocco. In this treaty there was an exchange of arms to Morocco with French slaves. Also, the treaty secured the traffic to enlarge the French trade in the Atlantic Ocean.⁴⁵

In Algiers, a French mission failed to free three hundred and forty-seven captives from the Barbary corsairs in 1635. Those captives were cheaply purchased in the Barbary slaves' market. Thus, ten years later and due to the feeling of nationalism towards those French captives, France declared war on Algiers. French weapons and ships were also captured by Algiers' corsairs. However, the corsairs' capturing of the French military ships did not pass unpaid.⁴⁶ In 1683, the great Admiral Abraham Duquesne (1610–1688), a French naval officer, bombarded the city of Algiers with six thousand rounds of different ammunition and killed eighty thousand people. This

⁴³ "Battle of Tangier (1437)." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 16 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tangier_(1437). Accessed on 14 May 2019.

⁴⁴ Barnes 18.

⁴⁵ De Montmorency, J. E. G. "The Barbary States in International Law." *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, vol. 4, 1918, pp. 87–94. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/743048.p. 5

⁴⁶ Davis 8.

attack infuriated the corsairs of Algiers. Therefore, the corsairs filled their guns with twenty-one Frenchmen and shot them back at the French fleet.⁴⁷

In 1689, another French attack to the town of Algiers was arranged by sending a squadron to overwhelm Algiers' corsairs but the latter were victorious. Six ships were expropriated and forty-four Frenchmen were captured and sold as slaves. To settle this dispute, a treaty of peace was signed in 1692 with Algiers for a period of one hundred years.⁴⁸ In 1729, Tripoli adopted the same treaty.⁴⁹

As for Italy, she was the weakest amongst the European countries which the Barbary States found as a source of an easy-made fortune. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Italian states like Venice and Genoa gave their fighting ships and treasures so as to satisfy the Barbary corsairs' needs. These Italian states had to pay to secure their trade in the Mediterranean Sea.⁵⁰ To guarantee their security, these states concluded three peace treaties in 1540, 1566 and 1575.⁵¹

Besides these continental European states; England was under the reign of Henry VIII Tudor between 1509 and 1547, England's commerce saw a kind of improvement and continued flourishing in the reign of Elizabeth I in 1580s onward.⁵² English ships spread worldwide freely and safely due to the powerful naval force that England acquired. Despite this naval activity, England was compelled to pursue the same system of paying tributes for protection which the former European countries had to adopt.⁵³

⁴⁷ Wheelan.48.

⁴⁸ "Bombardment of Algiers (1683)." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 27 Apr. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Algers_%281683%29. Accessed 03 December 2018.

⁴⁹ De Montmorency 5&.91.

⁵⁰ Ágoston and Masters 83.

⁵¹ Horii, Yutaka. *Changes in the Ottoman-Venetian Treaties in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Yutaka. 2017.p.2-3

⁵² "An Introduction to Tudor England." *English Heritage*, www.english-heritage.org.uk/learn/story-of-england/tudors/. Accessed on 19 September 2019.

⁵³ *U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State,history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/barbary-wars. Accessed on 19 May 2019.

In 1655, Cromwell Robert Blake challenged to depose the most powerful Barbary State or all the Barbary States at once by sending thirty ships to the Mediterranean Sea, but this attempt resulted in the withdrawal of the English ships.⁵⁴

In 1662, England signed treaties with Tunis and Tripoli. The treaties provided the rights to the English merchants for free trade and to appoint English consuls as arbiters of international disputes between the Barbary States and the other countries⁵⁵. In addition, another treaty was signed with Tripoli by the English Naval Commander Sir John Narborough so as to release some English captives who were seized previously in early conflicts and to establish strong relations between the two powers.⁵⁶

England tried to set good relations with the Barbary States. Indeed, these relations were strengthened when Charles II and the Dey of Algiers signed a treaty of peace and commerce in 1682 which stated that English vessels could safely come to the port of Algiers, or any other port or place of that state, where they could freely buy and sell. They could also freely pass the seas traffic without any search and no English subjects could be bought or sold or made slaves in any part of the state of Algiers⁵⁷. In 1686, Sir John Soame sought to get the Sultan's approval to this treaty in order to get an official agreement from both the local and the supreme Barbary powers.⁵⁸

All the previous treaties which created good relations with the Barbary States were profitable to England's domination in the Mediterranean Sea over France

⁵⁴Wilson, Gary E. *American Prisoners in the Barbary Nations, 1784 - 1816*. PhD Thesis. University of Denton, Texas, 1979. Web. 15 Sep 2018. .P.11

⁵⁵ Davis 11.

⁵⁶ De Montmorency 90.

⁵⁷Hertslet, Lewis. *A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions at Present Subsisting Between Great Britain of Foreign Powers; so Far as they Relate to Commerce and Navigation; to the Repression and Abolition of the Slave Trade; and to the Privileges and Interests of the Subjects of the High Contracting Parties*. Volume 1, T. Egerton, Bookseller to the Ordinance, Whitehall, 1820. P58-59

⁵⁸ De Montmorency 91.

and Spain.⁵⁹ During the 1680s, the Barbary States provided alimentary supplies to the British Royal Navy in Mediterranean Sea and its garrison at Gibraltar to face the French and the Spanish privateers and warships.⁶⁰

In North Africa, Gibraltar was an essential trading outpost to European countries. Morocco was amongst the Barbary States which had a front to this strait. Thus, Gibraltar and some north Moroccan towns were conquered by the Spanish in 1415.⁶¹ Britain negotiated with Morocco to allow her to establish a naval base or outpost in Gibraltar. With its powerful Royal Naval force, Britain could control this outpost and free Morocco from the Spanish⁶². This outpost was regarded as an opportunity to Britain so as to prevent other European merchants to compete the British trade in the Mediterranean waters.⁶³ In 1727, Spain attempted to besiege Gibraltar several times but it failed. As a result, Spain and Britain entered in a long struggle between 1740s and 1780s so as to restore Gibraltar zone but all Spanish attempts were in vain.

In 1716, Vice Admiral John Baker created a sort of British transit passport with the Barbary States by which it could prevent any Barbarian contravention against its vessels or merchants. This passport gave the British vessels special trading privileges in Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli and Morocco.⁶⁴ So, these vessels were automatically freed after being recognized belonging to Britain. For instance, one hundred and fifty-two captives were released by the Dey of Algiers in 1738. Furthermore, in 1749, Captains and crews of twenty-seven British ships were released

⁵⁹ Plank, Geoffrey. "Making Gibraltar British in the Eighteenth Century." *History*, vol. 98, no. 331, 2013, pp. 346–369., doi:10.1111/1468-229x.12013. p.351-352

⁶⁰ Plank 347 & 366.

⁶¹ Wilson 8-9

⁶² Brown, J. A. O. C. "Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy Of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706–1708." *The Historical Journal*, vol. 51, no. 3, 2008, pp. 599–620., doi:10.1017/s0018246x08006936. p.604-605

⁶³ Davis 12.

⁶⁴ Palotas, Zsolt. *Political, Military and Cultural Impact of the North African Muslims on the United States during the First Years of the Early Republic 1783-1807*. Real Publishing. 24 -25

in another treaty with Algiers, a treaty which was approved by the British parliament.⁶⁵ The third article in the treaty stated that:

"That all ships, and other vessels, [.....] shall freely pass the seas, and traffic [.....] any of the said ships or vessels, shall be wholly free, and shall not be stopped, taken or plundered, nor receive any harm or damage whatsoever from either party."⁶⁶

A.6. The American- Barbary Relations

Unlike the European countries that had a naval force and an independent country, the British American colonies wanted to protect their commercial interests in the Mediterranean Sea. These colonies had to face the Barbary corsairs' menace in the water to fulfill their goals.

Before the independence, the American vessels and merchants benefited from all the British foreign policies that were established and privileges which were gained by some countries mainly the Barbary States.⁶⁷ The latter opened its ports to the British and the American traders and adventurers so as to expand their trade and gather wealth. By their arrival to the North African shores, American merchants developed markets of that area with their variety of goods as well as their experience in commerce.⁶⁸

It was estimated that twelve hundred American seamen, navigating between eighty and one hundred ships of twenty thousand tons, engaged annually in

⁶⁵ Daly 12.

⁶⁶Hertslet 59.

⁶⁷Maameri, Fatima. *Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with Particular Emphasis on Relations with the United States of America, 1776-1816*. PhD Thesis. University Mentouri, Constantine, 2008. Web. 19 Mar 2019.p.161

⁶⁸ Maameri 166.

commercial activities. The American ships carried one-sixth of the total flour and wheat of the colonial exports to the Mediterranean ports, in addition, to one-fourth of dried or pickled fish. Few other commodities such as rum, rice, pine, oak, cedar lumber, beeswax and onions were shipped to North Africa. All these exported goods were estimated in 1770 at 707,000 dollars. Concerning the imports of the Americans from North Africa, they amounted to 228, 682 dollars in 1769 and contained chiefly wines, salt, oil, and Moroccan leather⁶⁹.

The American merchants benefited too much from the British policy in the Mediterranean Sea. This policy enabled them to engage in profitable commerce, freed them from tributes and provided them with safety from the Barbary Corsairs.⁷⁰ As a result, the American colonies became strong economically. In addition, they could build up lots of commercial ships which enabled them trading worldwide without British royal instructions.⁷¹

In 1754, the American-British relations deteriorated when Britain with its colonists embarked on war with France and right after the triumph over the French, Britain forced the American people living in the colonies to pay high taxes.⁷² Thus, the Americans reacted angrily and decided to put an end to the colonists' greed and to set up their own republic.⁷³ On July 4th, 1776, Britain drafted "the Declaration of Independence" which stated that the thirteen colonies would no longer be under the

⁶⁹Bovill, E. W. "North Africa in the Middle Ages." *African Affairs*, XXX, no. CXIX, 1931, pp. 128–141., doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a101594..p. 140

⁷⁰Monsieurs 24.

⁷¹Nettels, Curtis P. "British Mercantilism and the Economic Development of the Thirteen Colonies." *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 12, no. 02, 1952, pp. 105–114., doi:10.1017/s0022050700055133. .p.108-109

⁷²Lucas, Paul. "A Note on the Comparative Study of the Structure of Politics in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Its American Colonies." *The William and Mary Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 2, 1971, p. 301., doi:10.2307/1917313.p.303

⁷³Dickinson, H. T. "The Failure of Conciliation: Britain and the American Colonies 1763-1783." *The Kyoto Economic Review*, vol. 79, no. 2 (167), 2010, pp. 2–20. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/43213389. p.10-11

British rule.⁷⁴ After several scattered wars between the American thirteen colonies and Britain, the Treaty of Paris acknowledged the United States as an independent nation with a free government who could manage its own affairs and get rid of the dependency and the relations with the royal system of the British King.⁷⁵ Yet, the infant and the newly born nation had to tolerate circumstances and responsibility for being free of the British authority. In addition the loss of the British privileges, treaties and protection would lead the United States to face the threats of the Barbary States in the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁶

The USA went out of the Revolutionary war with a meager and a sick economy⁷⁷. Therefore, it was necessary for it and its merchants to continue their trading activity by searching for European and Eastern markets where they could exchange or sell their shipments.⁷⁸ The United States' ships continued to raise the British flags when encountering the Barbary corsairs. Besides, these ships had to show counterfeited British passports to ensure their bypassing safely. Yet, the British authority could uncover the United States' illegal action. In reaction to this situation, the British Consul General to the United States, Sir John Temple, sent a letter to John Jay, the American Secretary for foreign Affairs in which he blamed him for that unethical behavior. For that, Britain turned a blind eye on this matter and behaved as if nothing happened.⁷⁹

Few months after a series of the counterfeiting incidents committed by the United States' ships, the Barbary corsairs knew about this matter and started to

⁷⁴ O'Callaghan, Bryn "An Illustrated History of the USA". Longman, 2004. p.27-35

⁷⁵ O'Callaghan 31.

⁷⁶Freewalt, Jason Andrew. *The Barbary Corsairs: Conquerors of United States Commerce and the Articles of Confederation*. MA Thesis. University of Marion, Indiana, 1998. Web. 06 Oct 2018. P. 10

⁷⁷Freewalt 26.

⁷⁸ Farber, Hannah, A. *A Debt to North Africa: The Dey of Algiers Considered as an Investor in the United States, 1795-96*. MA Thesis. University of California, Berkeley, 2012. Web. 28 Sep 2018.p.4-5

⁷⁹Maameri 171-173.

differentiate between the British ships that had legal passports and the United States' ships that had forged ones.⁸⁰ Here, the United States had to find other ways to ensure passing their ships safely. In order to seek the free transit that was hardly obtainable from the Barbary States, the United States tried to build up good relations with these states. These relations regrettably witnessed a kind of instability and disagreements. Yet, the United States was obliged to sign peace and friendly treaties with the Barbary States; otherwise, she would embark on a series of wars that she was not ready to wage.⁸¹ In 1778, the USA chose an indirect way so as to protect its citizens, trade and ships, through signing peace treaty with the Barbary States with the assistance of some European countries mainly France.⁸²

The European countries and the United States found the Barbary States' corsairs' existence in the Mediterranean Sea as an obstacle to carry on and to widen their commercial activities freely. The United States was one of the Barbary States' easy targets. From 1779 to 1800, the United States' hardship with the Barbary States increased. Therefore, she entered to the stage of an extortion on grand scale with the Barbary States which would lead to the wars later.⁸³

B. Factors Leading to the Wars

After introducing relations in the previous background, it is necessary to discuss the variety of factors leading to the American- Barbary wars. These factors are of political, commercial and military importance.

⁸⁰ Farber, Hannah. "Millions for Credit: Peace with Algiers and the Establishment of America's Commercial Reputation Overseas, 1795–96." *Journal of the Early Republic*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2014, pp. 187–217., doi:10.1353/jer.2014.0028. .p.201

⁸¹ DeMar, Gary. *America's 200-Year War with Islamic Terrorism, the Strange Case of the Treaty of Tripoli*. 2009.p.23

⁸²Kitzen, Michael. "Money Bags or Cannon Balls: The Origins of the Tripolitan War, 1795-1801." *Journal of the Early Republic*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1996, p. 601., doi:10.2307/3124419.p. 603

⁸³ Kitzen 604.

B.1. The Political Factors

Following the incident of the forged passes which the United States adopted to cross the Mediterranean Sea without the Barbary States' harassments, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli started to tighten control on the American ships, merchants and vessels so as the United States would have to pay the passing fees. Consequently, the Barbary States found a strong opposition from the United States to subdue to their orders which led the Barbary corsairs to deal with the American properties in the Mediterranean Sea with a special treatment.⁸⁴

For the Barbary corsairs, the American vessels caught in the Mediterranean were more precious than any other commodity. Those white captives were exchanged for ransoms or employed as servants with little cost. White slaves were much more preferable than the Black ones by the Barbary corsairs because they were very lucrative and could help refresh their economy.⁸⁵ Regarding this situation, the United States first refused to pay tributes but later on she was obliged to subdue to the Barbary corsairs' continuous demands so as to release its vessels.⁸⁶

Before 1776, American merchant vessels enjoyed the protection of the British Royal Navy but the Barbary States launched assaults on American ships to seize anything they contained. American ships were full of people and merchandise.⁸⁷ In 1785, Algiers corsairs captured two American ships called *Dauphin* and *Maria*. The Dey of Algiers, Muhammed V, asked the United States' government to pay \$80,000

⁸⁴ Maameri 54.

⁸⁵ Barnes 9-11.

⁸⁶ Rojas, Martha Elena. "“Insults Unpunished”: Barbary Captives, American Slaves, and the Negotiation of Liberty.” *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2003, pp. 159–186., doi:10.1353/eam.2007.0061.p.185-186

⁸⁷ Adams, Thomas James. *American Foreign Policy and the Ottoman State, 1774-1837, as Revealed in United States Documents*. MA Thesis. California State University, Sacramento 2007. Web. 25 Sep 2018..p.24-25

as a tribute to set free both ships' crews.⁸⁸ To hasten releasing these captives, Thomas Jefferson, who was a US minister to France, sent an American agent to Algiers to pay the ransom. The agent's mission failed because the price imposed by Algiers was so high that he could not afford it. In fact, Thomas Jefferson did not accept the idea of paying a high ransom to the Barbary States because he said that it was a matter of national honor. Jefferson preferred waging wars against Algiers and seizing its sailors to exchange them with American captives.⁸⁹

Another American attempt in Congress to make a treaty with Algiers was concluded in 1791. John Paul Jones was another agent who went to make negotiation with Algiers but he died on his way thereto.⁹⁰ Three years later, Algiers doubled the number of captured American vessels and sailors. In 1794, the United States appointed an American Consul to Algiers so as to conclude an agreement to release crews of the *Maria* and *Dauphin* ships and other American captives. As a result, the United States accepted to give \$2,247,000 in cash, bribe of jewelry and 36-gun frigate. Shortly after paying the tribute, all captives who were still alive were released in 1796.⁹¹ In fact, that tribute demanded from the Dey reached \$1 million. That sum amounted to a quarter of the American federal budget.⁹²

All the treaties did not stop the Barbary States from making new demands. Algiers violated its treaty by asking two new US warships in 1797, during John Adams' presidency. The two warships were named the *Crescent* and *Hamdullah*. John Adams was forced to surrender because at that time the United States was so busy

⁸⁸ Wheelan 51-52.

⁸⁹ King 15.

⁹⁰ Boston, Rob. *Joel Barlow and the Treaty with Tripoli a Tangled Tale of Pirates, a Poet and the True Meaning of the First Amendment*. Americans United for Separation of Church and State.2005.p2

⁹¹ Wilson 99-101.

⁹² King 17.

with the "Quasi-War"⁹³. It was only after the war ended in 1801 that the United States could take a stand against the corsairs and she had also to prepare itself for the war with the Barbary States.⁹⁴

The United States' troubles with the Barbary States continued. Right after settling all disputes and paying all ransoms to the Dey of Algiers, here came the turn of the Tripolitan state. In 1796, the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf, seized two American ships called *Sophia* and the *Betsey*.⁹⁵ The *Sophia* ship was released because it was loaded with tributes to the Dey of Algiers and the *Betsey* ship was incorporated by the Bashaw into the navy of Tripoli and he renamed it the *Meshouda*.

With the loss of the American ship the *Betsey*, the United States demanded help from the Dey of Algiers. Subsequently, the United States' Consul of Algiers, Richard O'Brien, gave \$40,000 to Tripoli to release the *Betsey's* crew. Bashaw Yusuf rejected the money saying that the sum was smaller than the one given to the Dey of Algiers. Tripoli accepted to release the *Betsey's* crew for a sum of \$52,000 and other naval supplies.⁹⁶

In 1799, the Bashaw Yusuf of Tripoli persisted to have an American consul in his state and James Cathcart was appointed to that post⁹⁷ The American consul offered a sum of \$18, 000 as a reconciliation between the United States and Tripoli. The ruler of Tripoli accepted the offer and sent a letter to the American President in which he promised that peace would be restored. He requested the President that Tripoli should be treated like the other Barbary States.⁹⁸

⁹³ The Quasi-War was an undeclared war fought almost entirely at sea between the United States and France from 1798 to 1800, which broke out during the beginning of John Adams's presidency.

⁹⁴ Kolbaia, David. *Pro Georgia Journal of Kartvelological Studies*. No 28, E Editorial Address. 1991. p.110

⁹⁵ Palotas 25.

⁹⁶ King 18.

⁹⁷ Sutton, Angela. *White Slaves in Barbary: The Early American Republic, Orientalism and the Barbary Pirates*. MA Thesis, 2009. Web. 16 Dec 2018..P.14

⁹⁸ King 19.

The Bashaw Yusuf felt underestimated by the United States because his country was not as powerful as the state of Algiers. In 1800, Yusuf's admirals seized the American brig named *Catherine*. The brig was released due to a direct order of Yusuf who in turn asked tribute from the United States.⁹⁹ The Bashaw wanted to get a quick reply within six months from the United States otherwise a war between the countries would be inevitable. The Bashaw Yusuf expected to get a high tribute. Consequently, Cathcart the Consul sent the demands of the Bashaw to the American government and he insisted in his letter that the war was the best way to limit Bashaw's greed. The United States decided that it would no longer be a tributary nation and would rather establish a naval force to declare war on the Barbary States.¹⁰⁰

The Barbary States knew that the United States was in a weak position and she had no other choice but accept to pay money. This extortion on a large scale would come to an end because all the American consuls in the Barbary States started to feel a kind of humiliation and threats from these States.¹⁰¹ Captain William Brainbridge was obliged to take tributes to the Dey in an American ship carrying Algiers flag. Actually, he did not approve of this in a letter: "Sir, I cannot help observing that the event of this day makes me ponder on the words Independent United States".¹⁰² In the presidential election campaign of 1800, Thomas Jefferson promised that if he were elected a president, he would stop the foreign policy of subservience. Shortly after being elected, Thomas Jefferson warned all the Barbary States in a speech: "I am

⁹⁹Ross, Nicholas. *The Provision of Naval Defense in the Early American Republic Comparison of the U.S. Navy and Privateers, 1789–1815*. The Independent Review, v. 16, 2011.P.426

¹⁰⁰Wilson 144.

¹⁰¹Swanson, Claudea. *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*. Volume I Part 1 of 4, American Naval Records Society Bolton Landing, New York, 2011.p.165

¹⁰²Erenow. *The Humiliation of the USS George Washington*. erenow network. <https://erenow.net/modern/forgottenwar/5.php>. Accessed 12 April 2019.

an enemy to all these doeurs, tributes and humiliation. I know that nothing will stop the eternal increase from pirates but the presence of an armed force”.¹⁰³

B.2. Trade

Americans believed in the notion of free trade, but Britain used to blockade all illegal trading practices of the American merchants which enabled them to accumulate big wealth.¹⁰⁴ However, after the independence, the United States wanted to keep and impose the free trade principle internationally.

Trading in the Mediterranean was the spinal cord to the United States so as to restore the income balance which was mismanaged by the British colonizer.¹⁰⁵ But, the Barbary States saw that the presence of American merchant ships in the Mediterranean waters was a violation to their right in the area unless fees for passing ships were paid.¹⁰⁶ In several negotiations with the Barbary States, the United States succeeded to make a deal with Morocco. This deal was to establish a safe passage for the American ships in the Mediterranean.¹⁰⁷

The United States found itself in a need both to contest its British rivalry in commerce and to impose its existence on activity in the Mediterranean through overwhelming the Barbary States to widen its trading activity or sphere.¹⁰⁸ In an unsuccessful attempt, the United States sought the help of some European countries to secure its commercial interests in the Mediterranean but the latter failed in doing so.

Some European countries like Britain benefited from the existence of the Barbary States in the Mediterranean Sea. Since Great Britain was still the enemy of

¹⁰³ Kennedy, Charles Stuart. *The American Consul, a History of the United States Consular Service, 1776-1924*. New Academia Publishing, 2015.p.37

¹⁰⁴Maameri 162-163.

¹⁰⁵ Farber 4.

¹⁰⁶ Lardas 7.

¹⁰⁷ Wilson 28-30.

¹⁰⁸ Claudea 3.

the United States, she disturbed the American merchants' way to reach the British and other worldwide markets. American merchants doubted as to British intention and were convinced that the latter wanted to hamper their commerce. They thought that the British had some hidden conspiracies with the Barbary States so as to prevent them from crossing the Mediterranean waters. Benjamin Franklin commented on this situation when he said: "Not improbable, that those rovers [Barbary States] may be privately encouraged by the English to fall upon us, and to prevent our interference in the carrying trade."¹⁰⁹

B.3. The Navy

The United States' important military strategy was primarily built upon the naval force. In 1775, the American Continental Navy was licensed in the First Continental Congress as an important sea water force to the nation.¹¹⁰ Actually, the American naval force was a combination of merchants and seamen who used their ships and tools to overwhelm the British naval dominance in the American waters. The federal government bought these ships and converted them into warships. As a result, the Navy acquired 12 ships with 4000 manpower between officers and men and their number increased when new vessels joined the service.¹¹¹

Another attempt to develop the American naval force resulted from the Naval Act of 1794. The Act came as a response to the attacks of the Barbary States against the American merchants in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, six frigates came into service in May and October 1797.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Maameri 233.

¹¹⁰ "American Revolutionary War 1775 to 1783". *The Continental Navy*. americanwarsus. Jul 6, 2017. <https://revolutionarywar.us/continental-navy/>. Accessed 16 April 2019.

¹¹¹ Barnes 28.

¹¹² Monsieurs 46.

The availability of the six frigates gave the United States self-confidence and self-esteem to encounter any foreign country even if they were the Barbary States. The United States felt that it was the right time to put an end to peace treaties which the Barbary States did not respect. The construction of the frigates gave hope to the United States' government and its merchant vessels to receive protection from their authority so as to pass freely without fear of the Barbary corsairs.¹¹³ The United States enthusiastically asserted that spending millions for defense was better than one cent for tribute.¹¹⁴

The American Naval force witnessed a kind of rapid growth after the end of the Quasi War. The American Naval force also acquired French experience of fighting and some war tactics. That was actually a big step towards believing in the reliability of the naval force's strength and declaring war on the Barbary States.¹¹⁵

Compared with the European navy, Barbary States military naval force became weak at the end of the eighteenth century. They had simple fleets by which they could quell their enemies. Also, they had installed batteries and thousands of cannons on their coastal areas targeting any suspected assaults against them. With this interior strategy, the Barbary States did not have the intention to develop their coastal defense. Thus, they were an easy target for the European countries and this fact gave the United States courage to operate its newly created small Naval Force. Though, the United States financed heavily in order to develop its navy, it sought to use the Barbary States as a training ground both to test the readiness of its Naval force and to protect its commerce, merchants and ships in that area.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Palotas 32.

¹¹⁴ Blogger. The Federalist: Robert Goodloe Harper. thefederalist.2011. <http://thefederalistgary.blogspot.com/2013/02/robert-goodloe-harper-millions-for.html>. Accessed 23.05.2019 .

¹¹⁵ King 16.

¹¹⁶ Barnes 7-8.

Conclusion

All these factors drove the United States to reconsider her foreign policy and dealings with the Barbary States. Under the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the United States had believed in the policy of survival through war.

Chapter II:

The Two American – Barbary Wars 1801- 1816

Introduction

After stating the factors leading to the wars between the United States and the Barbary States in the previously, the second chapter sheds light on the main events that happened between the two powers. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section is concerned with the first war that flared between the United States and Tripoli, Morocco and Tunis which had taken place from 1801 to 1805. The second section of the chapter concentrates on the second war which broke out between the United States and Algiers from 1815 to 1816.

A. The First American – Barbary War 1801 – 1805: War With Tripoli

In 1801, the United States reached a difficult stage which was a crucial period that would either change the United States' position worldwide and turn it among the powerful countries or remain a weak and a tribute payer country for eternity to the Barbary States.¹

When Thomas Jefferson became president on 23rd, March 1800, he sought to change the former presidents' policy towards the Barbary States. Jefferson discussed the issue of the Barbary States with the Cabinet in which he preferred using force to quell these states.² But the lack of experienced war men and a strong navy were an obstacle for the United States' Congress to engage in a war with these states. However, the war was inevitable.

After electing Thomas Jefferson, Republicans in Congress did not give naval force enough monetary support, which left the navy with little power to get into

¹ Adams 27-28.

² Carson, David A. *Jefferson, Congress, and the Question of Leadership in the Tripolitan War*. Virginia Historical Society, Vol. 94, No. 4, 1986.p.410-412

war with the Barbary States. Thomas Jefferson had another plan for sending the navy; he could finance it from the State's Treasury.³ As a result, Congress gave him the authority to declare war. Without hesitation, Thomas Jefferson ordered the navy to send squadrons to the Mediterranean.⁴

A.1. The First Squadron 1801 1802

In May 1801, the Secretary of the Navy appointed Captain Richard Dale for the first squadron; he used to serve on board naval craft since he was twelve years old.⁵ In 1776, he joined the Continental Navy after the Declaration of Independence. He received the rank of Captain once the navy had been created in 1794.⁶ Richard Dale took command on the frigates called *President* 44-guns, *Philadelphia* 36-guns, and *Essex* 32-guns in addition to smaller schooner called *Enterprise* 12-guns.⁷

To avoid engaging in war, Richard Dale handed the Bashaw the letter of friendship sent by the President and reminded him of the previous peace treaty of 1796. However, Jefferson knew that the Bashaw would not compromise.⁸ Richard Dale had also a contingency plan in case he would embark on a war with Tripoli. This plan was to blockade the Tripolitan corsairs' ports and ruin as many warships as he could during the war.⁹

³ King 22.

⁴ Tucker, Spencer C. *The Encyclopedia of the Wars of the Early American Republic, 1783-1812, a Political, Social, and Military History*, ABC-CLIO, 2014.p.342

⁵ Harris, Thomas M.D. *The Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge, United States Navy*. Carey Lea & Blanchard, 1837.p.63

⁶ Sherburne, John Henery. *Life and Character of the Chevalier John Paul Jones, a Captain in the Navy of the United States During the Revolutionary War*. Venderpol & Cole, Printers, NY, 1916.p. 362-363

⁷ Alden, Carroll S. *A Short History of the United States Navy*. Wipf & Stock, 2017.p. 64

⁸ King 23.

⁹ Oachs, Emily. *Rose Thomas Jefferson's Presidency*. Lerner Publishing Group, Inc., 2017.p.47

On May 14th, the Bashaw decided to wage war on American ships.¹⁰ He made his decision after his unsuccessful attempts to get an annual tribute from his American Consul, James Cathcart. Meanwhile, Cathcart insisted on the Bashaw not to violate the peace treaty of 1796 which stated that no further tributes would be given to Tripoli. But the Bashaw still insisted to get the annual tributes. To end this negotiation, Cathcart ordered the American ships to sail to the Mediterranean.¹¹

When Richard Dale arrived to Gibraltar and anchored therein, he discovered that the Bashaw had already declared war on the United States.¹² When he anchored his warship, he saw the warship the *Meshouda* which was the American *Betsey* before it had been captured in 1796 by Tripoli. The *Meshouda* was sailing to the Atlantic Ocean to search for American merchants' ships to raid. Captain Dale could do nothing for it since Gibraltar was a neutral British harbor. In addition the *Meshouda* was under the command of Peter Lisle who had been a Scottish sailor in the *Betsey* before it was captured. The United States could release the *Betsey's* crew after being ransomed but Lisle preferred to stay in Tripoli and convert to Islam.¹³ For their safety, Captain Dale ordered the *Philadelphia* under the command of Samuel Barron to blockade the *Meshouda* and then he continued to Tripoli.¹⁴

The Tripolitan sailors' of *Mashouda* suffered a lot from shortage of food. Also, English sailors who controlled Gibraltar refused to provide the *Meshouda* commander with supplies. As a result, 150 pirates left their ships trying to survive but

¹⁰ Baepler, Paul. *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*. The University of Chicago Press LTd, 1999.p.159

¹¹ King 23.

¹² Kennedy 1802.

¹³ Wilson 158.

¹⁴ Allison, Robert J. *Stephen Decatur: American Naval Hero, 1779-1820*. University of Massachusetts Press, 2005.p.29

they were seized by English sailors and sent to Morocco. The rest of the pirates including the commander could flee and reach Tripoli.¹⁵

After Dale reached Tripoli on July 24th, 1801, he met the Bashaw Karamanli, he told him that he did not have the right to violate the old treaty and that he had to accept the truce. The Bashaw refused the offer which led Dale to blockade the city of Tripoli for eighteen days.¹⁶

During the eighteen days, Dale's supplies began to diminish. Thus, he went to Malta and had his ships loaded with the necessary provisions.¹⁷ In his way back to Tripoli, he captured a Greek ship coming from Constantinople carrying merchandise and Tripolitan citizens including one officer and fourteen merchants, twenty soldiers, and five women. Captain Dale seized this opportunity to force the Bashaw to release the American captives, and he succeeded to do so. The Bashaw released six Americans for twenty-one soldiers and eight merchants in conformity with 3rd, September's agreement.¹⁸

Few days later, the *Enterprise* that was sent to protect American commerce in the Mediterranean got into conflict with Tripolitan corsairs which resulted in causing damages to the warship. The *Enterprise* was under the command of Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett. The latter's plan to fly the British colors on the schooner proved to be fruitful. When Sterrett got closer to the corsairs, he surprised them with a sudden attack. The last step for Sterrett after the end of the battle was to sink the Tripolitan ship. The battle of the *Enterprise* with the Tripolitan ship resulted in killing fifty corsairs out of eighty men but there had been no deaths or injuries for

¹⁵ Wilson 158.

¹⁶ Brodine, Charles E. et al. *Interpreting Old Ironsides: An Illustrated Guide to USS Constitution*. Naval Historical Centre, Washington, 2007. p.36

¹⁷ James, William. *The Naval History of Great Britain*. Volume 3, Cambridge, 2010.p.160

¹⁸ Frost, John. *The Pictorial History of the United States of America: From the Discovery by the Northmen in the Tenth Century to the Present Time*. Tiffany and Company, 1849.p.29-30

Americans. The rest of the corsairs of the Tripolitan ship could survive and reach Tripoli.¹⁹

In December, 1801, the frigate *Boston* was sent by Congress as a relief to the squadron. It was commanded by Daniel McNeil. Meanwhile, Dale lifted the blockade of Tripoli due to severe illnesses among the crew and then he proceeded to Gibraltar. He sent the *Enterprise* to Baltimore on February 17th, 1802. Captain Richard Dale did not succeed completely in applying what he was sent for; however, what he did was better than nothing. In April 1802, he sailed back to the United States where Congress replaced him by Richard Valentine Morris.²⁰

A.2. The Second Squadron 1802-1803

On 6th, February, Congress passed an act authorizing President Thomas Jefferson to use force against Tripoli. The President decided to send a second squadron to the Mediterranean and Captain Richard Valentine Morris was appointed to command this mission.²¹

Captain Richard Valentine Morris Valentine was not like his father and his uncle who served the United States due to their important political positions.²² Morris was not so tough in dealing with the corsairs though he was the commander of a strong force. In other words, Morris considered his mission to Tripoli a journey for joy since he took with him his wife, children and a servant on the *Chesapeake*. In

¹⁹ Van Beverhoudt, Arnold Jr. *These are the Voyages, a History of the Ships, Aircraft, and Spacecraft Named Enterprise*. Beverhoudt Company, 1990. p. 35-36

²⁰ Bradford, James C. *America, Sea Power, and the World*. Willey Blackwell, 2016. p.38

²¹ Thompson, Antonio S. and Frentzos, Christos G. *The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History the Colonial Period to 1877*. Routledge, NY & UK, 2015.p.168

²² "Richard Valentine Morris." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 8 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Valentine_Morris. Accessed 14 December 2018.

addition, he permitted his sailors to bring their wives. In fact, Morris' silly decisions showed his carelessness to the glory of the mission he was sent for.²³

Morris' squadron consisted of seven frigates in addition to three already at sea. The force contained the *Chesapeake*, 36-gun frigate, under the Commodore Richard Valentine Morris. The *Constellation*, 36-gun frigate, under Captain Alexander Murray. The *New York*, 36-gun frigate, conducted by Captain James Barron and Captain Isaac Chauncey. The *John Adams*, 28-gun frigate, under Captain John Rodgers. The *Boston*, 28-gun frigate, under Captain Daniel McNeill. The *Adams*, 28-gun frigate, under Captain Hugh Campbell command and the *Enterprise*, 12-gun schooner, under Lieutenant Andrew Sterett and Lieutenant Isaac Hull command.²⁴

Richard Morris arrived the Mediterranean Sea on May 25th, 1802 with the squadron. But when reaching Gibraltar, Morris had to stay almost three months to repair the few technical problems related to the *Chesapeake*. The rest of the force conducted an unsuccessful blockade on Tripoli. Morris was unable to coordinate between escorting the merchants' vessels and carrying the blockade at once due to his lack of experience.²⁵

Since Morris' blockade on Tripoli was unsuccessful, Tripolitans no longer feared the American warships. So, Consul Cathcart wrote a letter to the Secretary of State. He warned them about the serious problems that might happen to the American merchant vessels which refused to sail in convoy with the warships. Thus, on 17th, June, 1802, the Bashaw sent the corsairs to chase unarmed merchants ships. The corsairs could seize the brig called *Franklin* which was sailing near the coast of Spain. The Captain Andrew Morris and a crew of eight men who were aboard the *Franklin*

²³ Tucker 432.

²⁴ Wheelan 11.

²⁵ King 162.

were captured and brought up to Algiers on 26th, June.²⁶ To settle this problem, the United State asked the intervention of the Dey of Algiers. So, the captives were released after a negotiation between a representative of the Algerian Dey and the Bashaw to pay him a ransom of \$6.500. But the United States could not restore the *Franklin* because it was sold in Tunis.²⁷

When the American ships were preoccupied with Tripolitan corsairs, Morocco decided to wage a war against the United States.²⁸ But Morocco preferred to restore peaceful relations with the United States and accept the Emperor Muley Soliman's conditions. In February, 1802, the Emperor demanded the immediate release of the *Meshouda* which was still under American blockade. Since the *Meshouda* was in his territory, the Emperor assumed that the ship no longer belonged to Tripoli but to Morocco. Morris accepted the Emperor's demand.²⁹

While leaving Morocco and forwarding the squadron to Tripoli, Morris could not land in the Tripolitan shores owing to the stormy weather which led him to change direction to Malta for protection. From Malta, Richard Morris sailed to Tunis to settle the problem of the captured Turkish ship *Paulina* by the Americans, but the negotiation with the Bey was unfruitful. Morris declared that the ship's cargo should be carried to Tripoli but the Bey denied and told that the ship belonged to Tunis. Consequently, Morris was jailed when he attempted to leave Tunis and his fleet was put under seizure. However, Morris accepted to pay \$22,000 to the Bey for his release. In March, 1803, he was freed with other Americans and they left the city.³⁰

²⁶Tucker, Glenn. *Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the US Navy*. Bowsprit Books, 2019.p.153-154

²⁷ King 18-19.

²⁸ Clark, George B. *Battle History of the United States Marine Corps, 1775-1945*. Shatterstock, 2010. p.27

²⁹Lebow, Eileen F. *The Navy's Godfather: John Rodgers*. The Ocracoke Press, Washington, DC, 2012. p.55

³⁰Wilson 169.

On May 20th, 1803, Morris with his squadron which included the *New York*, *John Adams*, the *Enterprise* and the *Adams* came to Tripoli so as to have negotiation with the Bashaw minister, Mohammed Dghies, to end the war. The minister told Morris that the Bashaw demanded \$200,000 for peace and other compensations of the war damage. Morris suggested paying him \$15,000 at the end of five years providing that he remained faithful in keeping peace. As a result, the Bashaw refused and ordered Morris to leave the city.³¹

On June 10th, Morris left Tripoli to Malta together with the American warships. When reaching the Italian port, Morris divided the squadron by sending the majority of the force to Gibraltar to wait the arrival of additional United States' warships.³²

The apprentice captain Valentine Morris showed his inability to command his squadron. He involved the squadron in so many dangers without achieving great success. Besides, his contacts with the Secretary in the United States to keep them informed of his situations were very poor. Thus, on 21st, June 1803, Thomas Jefferson relieved Morris from commanding the squadron and replaced him with Edward Preble.³³

A.3. The Third squadron 1803-1804

In February, 1803, the American Congress decided to support the Navy with four small ships and fifteen gunboats. But Thomas Jefferson did not give up. He

³¹ Wilson 171-172.

³² Goldsborough, Charles Washington. *The United States' Naval Chronicle*. Volume 1, James Wilson, Washington, 1824. p.204-205

³³ Adams 41-42.

decided to send a new squadron due to Morris' failure and Captain Edward Preble was the President's choice.³⁴

Edward Preble served on the 62-gun *Protector* during the American Revolution. In 1798, he was appointed as a Lieutenant in the United States Navy by Congress and one year later he was promoted to Captain.

Unlike Morris, Preble did not accept to bring families and servants on board. He was so strict that his crew did not like him but sooner they got used to his character. Preble knew well how to manage his squadron.³⁵

The military fleet of the Commodore Edward Preble consisted of *Constitution*, 44-gun frigate under his command. The *Philadelphia*, 36-gun frigate, under the Captain William Bainbridge command. The *John Adams*, 28-gun frigate, under the command of Captain Isaac Chauncey. The *Siren*, 16-gun brig, under Lieutenant Charles Stewart command. The *Scourge*, 16-gun brig, led by Lieutenant John Dent and Midshipman Ralph Izard. The *Argus*, 16-gun brig, under Lieutenant Isaac Hull command. The *Vixen*, 12-gun schooner, was under Lieutenant John Smith Nautilus, 12-gun schooner and Lieutenant Richard Somers command. The *Enterprise*, 12-gun schooner was under Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, Jr. command. Finally, the *Intrepid*, 4-gun ketch, was under Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, Jr. and Lieutenant Richard Somers command.³⁶

On their way to Tripoli, Preble's fleet the *Philadelphia* under the command of William Bainbridge knew that a Moroccan ship *Mirboka* seized the American brig *Celia* on 17th, August, 1803. The Corsairs wanted to take the *Celia* crew as prisoners to Morocco but they were persecuted by William Bainbridge who released the

³⁴ Williams, Thomas. *American Honor: The Story of Admiral Charles Stewart*. Author house, 2012.p.114

³⁵ Bradford 161.

³⁶ Wheelan 11.

merchant men and captured the 22-gun corsairs' vessels with their crews and took them to Gibraltar. Bainbridge interrogated the corsairs and knew that there were orders from the Emperor of Morocco to seize American ships.³⁷

In another attempt, the Moroccan corsairs captured the brig *Hannah* and took it with its crew to Mogadore, Morocco. To free those captives, Captain Simpson met with the Emperor to negotiate peace and they succeeded to ratify the 1786 Treaty. Consequently, Preble freed the Moroccan prisoners and the warship *Mirboka*. In return, the Emperor freed the *Hannah* and its crew.³⁸

Under the command of Preble, the *Vixen* and the *Philadelphia* continued their mission to blockade Tripoli on 7th, October, 1803. By his arrival to Tripoli, the *Philadelphia* blockaded Tripoli while the *Vixen* was sent for patrol to west Tripoli. On 31st, October, 1803, the *Philadelphia* tried to chase a Tripolitan warship of 12-gun wanted to enter to the city of Tripoli but it did not succeed to do so. The unsuccessful tracking caused the *Philadelphia* to get stuck into the shores of Tripoli, almost five miles from the land. The captain and his crew tried rapidly to lighten the frigate by throwing heavy guns, supplies and other heavy materials. Few hours later, Tripoli launched their gunboats to capture the frigate. Plenty of fire shots targeted the *Philadelphia* until the Americans surrendered.³⁹

The *Philadelphia* became under the Tripolitan corsairs' control. They got on board the frigate and took any precious thing they found and all the captives were transported ashore. The three hundred prisoners were separated into officers and other soldiers. The twenty-five officers were taken to the Bashaw castle to interrogate them

³⁷ Paine, Lincoln. *War is Better than Tribute*. Volume 25, Office Printing Magazine. pp. 20–25. 2001.1845, pp. 265-276..p.4

³⁸ Sparks, Jared. *The Library of American Biography, Lives of Edward Preble and William Penn*, Little Brown Company, Volume 12, Boston, 1864.p.43-45

³⁹ “The Burning of the USS Philadelphia.” *Naval History Blog*, 18 Feb. 2015, www.navalhistory.org/2015/02/18/the-burning-of-the-uss-philadelphia. Accessed 20 March 2019.

about the squadron. Right after the interrogation, the prisoners were brought to a place called the American House which was guarded with forty-three armed men. In the same week when the American prisoners were brought to jail, the Tripolitans removed the *Philadelphia* from the rocky shore, restored all the cannons thrown in the sea and brought the ship to their harbor.

While in jail, the prisoners remained in contact with the United States due to the letters sent by Captain Bainbridge to the American naval officers and the government official. These letters would give them a clear view of how to conduct a war against Tripoli. Bainbridge used a tricky way to write his letters by using lemon juice as an ink. When the reader received the letter he had to put it on fire so as to read the hidden message. Bainbridge sent to Preble important details about Tripoli's defenses. He wrote to the Commodore that Tripoli had three warships in the harbor, five small galleys, and twelve gunboats.⁴⁰

In one of the letters sent by Bainbridge, a plan to restore or burn the *Philadelphia* was arranged by Preble. The latter knew that the *Philadelphia* was protected with few batteries. On 31st, January 1804, Preble chose Lieutenant Stephen Decatur to undertake the mission. Decatur took command of the *Intrepid* with seventy-five volunteers. Preble wanted Decatur to deceive the Tripolitans by declaring that the *Intrepid* was the *Transfer*. The *Transfer* was a ship that the Tripolitans had purchased and they were waiting its arrival.⁴¹

On 16th, February, Decatur reached the harbor of Tripoli and moved silently toward the *Philadelphia*. When the Tripolitan stopped the ship, Decatur indentified it as the *Transfer*. Decatur added that he got the permission to anchor next to the *Philadelphia* because he lost anchors due to the stormy weather. Decatur's plan

⁴⁰ Wheelan 157.

⁴¹ Manis 63.

proved to be successful and to hasten burning the frigate, the Americans boarded the *Philadelphia* and killed twenty Tripolitans but the others escaped. Before the arrival of the Tripolitans naval support, Decatur and his men poked the fire in the frigate and left the harbor. Few minutes later the frigate exploded and became unserviceable. Decatur could return safely to the fleet with one man wounded.⁴²

After burning the *Philadelphia*, the Bashaw ordered his subjects to be prepared in case of any American attack. Meanwhile, Preble decided to bombard Tripoli with a fleet consisting of the frigate, the *Constitution*, the brig *Syren*, *Argus*, and *Vixen*; the schooners *Nautilus*, *Enterprise*, and *Scourge*; two bomb vessels, six gunboats and 1,060 men including sailors. On the Tripolitan side, a fleet was ready to fight back the Americans, it consisted of 115 cannons, nineteen gunboats, two galleys, two schooners, a brig and 25,000 men. Due to the Tripolitan rocky shores and the stormy weather, the *Constitution* was unable to fight the vessels from a closer position and bombarded the city.⁴³

On August 3rd, when the storm faded away, Preble attacked the Tripolitan navy by sending six gunboats which succeeded to seize three corsairs' gunboats and wreck the others. After two hours of the fighting, both sides incurred casualties. On the one hand, Americans had one man killed and thirteen wounded. On the other, Tripolitans had sixty men murdered and fifty sailors were poisoned. In fact, the American gunboats, the *Constitution* and the warships had thrown over 200 shells into the city of Tripoli but later the attack was to stop. Preble sought to make a pause and start the fight again.⁴⁴

⁴² Harris 101-104.

⁴³ Frost, John. *American Naval Biography*. Applewood Books, Bedford, Massachusetts, 1844. p.153

⁴⁴ Clodfelter, Micheal. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and other Figures, 1492-2015*, 2017. p.197

On August 7th, the bomb vessels and the gunboats were ready to attack again. When the attack began, Tripolitans exploded an American warship full of gun powder. As a result, the explosion killed ten Americans and wounded six. Though the gunboat incident frustrated the Americans, the battle continued and over 500 shells were fired into the city of Tripoli. However, due to the Tripolitan building construction which was mainly with mortar, bombardment caused little damage to the city.⁴⁵

In another assault, Preble supported the squadron with extra materials. The attack started from the very morning until the last ammunition. One Tripolitan gunboat was sunk and four men in the Bashaw's castle were murdered. Actually, this assault killed many Tripolitans.⁴⁶

On September 3rd, Preble sought to make a final attack. He chose the *Interpid* for the mission to bombard the Tripolitan harbor. By September 4th, in its way to the harbor, the corsairs saw the *Intrepid* and commenced to fire it until it exploded. The *Intrepid* easily exploded because it contained approximately 100 barrels of powder and 15 shells. Therefore, no American aboard the warship was killed. Due to this massacre, Preble had to postpone attacking again until the arrival of the backup from Captain Samuel Barron.⁴⁷

A.4. The Fourth Squadron 1804-1805

President Thomas Jefferson decided to send other support for the squadron. Jefferson decided to replace Commodore Preble by Commodore Samuel Barron.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Wilson 243.

⁴⁶ Wilson 244-245.

⁴⁷ Peterson, Jacobs Charles. *The American Navy*. Boston Mass, 1829.p.188-190

⁴⁸ Richard, Frajola. "The Life and Times of John Rodgers." Web Design, 2016.p.16

Samuel Barron was promoted Captain after the end of the American Revolution. He had already served in a War against Tripoli as a Captain of the frigate *Philadelphia* in 1801. On September 10th, 1804, Captain Samuel Barron became commander of the fourth squadron against Tripoli.⁴⁹

The squadron of Samuel Barron consisted of the *President*, 44-gun frigate, the *Constitution*, 44-gun frigate, led by Captain Stephen Decatur, Jr. and Captain John Rodgers. The *Congress*, 36-gun frigate, under Captain John Rodgers and Captain Stephen Decatur, Jr. command. The *Essex*, 32-gun frigate, led by Captain James Barron and the *John Adams*, 28-gun frigate, under Captain Isaac Chauncey command. The *Siren*, 16-gun brig, led by Lieutenant Charles Stewart. The *Argus*, 16-gun brig, led by Lieutenant Isaac Hull. The *Vixen*, 12-gun schooner, under Lieutenant John Smith command. The *Nautilus*, 12-gun schooner, under Lieutenant John Dent command. The *Enterprise*, 12-gun schooner, led by Lieutenant Thomas Robinson, Jr. and the *Hornet*, 10-gun sloop, under Lieutenant Samuel Evans command.⁵⁰

When Barron arrived to the Mediterranean, he kept blockading Tripoli following Preble's strategy. This strategy started to affect the entire city of Tripoli.⁵¹ For the United States, the blockade would not end the war so fast. So as to hasten ending this war, a daring plan was arranged by the United States to destabilize the city's ruling system of Tripoli.⁵²

The United States' daring plan was to bring back the old Karamanli family dispute in order to wage a civil war in Tripoli. After the Bashaw's father died, Hamet Karamanli, the Bashaw's brother, became a ruler of Tripoli. Yusuf deposed his brother

⁴⁹ Hodge, Carl Cavanagh, and Nolan, Cathal J. *U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy: From 1789 to the Present*. ABC-Clio, 2007.p.30

⁵⁰ Wheelan 12.

⁵¹ Wheelan 238-239.

⁵² De Goey, Ferry. *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism, 1783–1914*. Routledge, London and New York, 2016. p.47

and sent him to exile.⁵³ Thus, the United States sought to support Hamet militarily and financially to depose his brother and rule the state. To bring Hamet Karamanli back from the exile, Commodore Barron ordered Isaac Hull, the Commander of the *Argus* with the company of William Eaton to sail to Alexandria to search for him. Barron ordered also to gather the supporters of Hamet in Derne or Benghazi so as to help them in their insurrection.⁵⁴

On April 25th, 1805, William Eaton and Hamet Karamanli could hardly cross a path of 700 miles from Alexandria to the rear of Tripoli. In Derne, despite the fact that most of its inhabitants supported Hamet, the strategic posts were under Yusuf's followers' control.⁵⁵

To overwhelm Yusuf's followers and to place Hamet as a governor on Derne, Eaton ordered for an attack to the city. During the attack, Eaton used the *Argus*, *Hornet*, and *Nautilus* warships cannons fire; yet, little resistance made Eaton's forces to withdraw. In the right time, Eaton demanded his men to reload the cannons and ordered the land forces to fire the city. Eaton could gain control over the city and started to build fortifications to prevent sudden attacks from the Bashaw.⁵⁶

Upon hearing about the Derne incident, the Bashaw hastened sending reinforcement to his followers. On May 8th, the Tripolitan army arrived to the exterior of the city of Derne and defeated Hamet's troops. But the Tripolitan army could not proceed in their way to the city due to the heavy shots launched by the American

⁵³ "Battle of Derne." *Military Wiki*, military.wikia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Derne. Accessed 13 February 2019.

⁵⁴ Monsieurs 37.

⁵⁵ Erenow. *Derna and Peace*. erenow network. <https://erenow.net/ww/jeffersons-war/17.php>. Accessed 12 April 2019.

⁵⁶ Gerber, Irving. *Cowardly America: How We Became a Paper Tiger*. Iuniverse, Inc. New York, Lincoln Shanghai, 2006.p.210-211

warships. This attack resulted in killing twenty-eight and wounded fifty-six Tripolitans. The latter decided to retreat but not to give up.⁵⁷

On June 10th, 1805, the Tripolitans received backups from the Bashaw to launch another attack. In their march to Derne, they were encountered with Hamet's troops and engaged in a conflict in which forty to sixty men were killed. To support Barron's force in Tripoli, Thomas Jefferson ordered to send extra warships in the Mediterranean and appointed John Rodgers to take Barron's place due to his former's deteriorating health conditions.⁵⁸

On May 21st, 1805, Derne became under Eaton and Hamet' control, meanwhile Tripoli was still under Barron' blockade. These facts made the Bashaw in a critical situation and his popularity started to decrease. So as to get out of this trouble, the Bashaw threatened the United States to kill all the American prisoners in case his brother Hamet would depose him from ruling Tripoli.⁵⁹

The Bashaw became so frustrated especially when he heard that his brother was conducting a huge squadron with the Americans to capture the cities of the coastal areas of Tripoli. Thus, the Bashaw feared to lose his rule and decided to handle a conference to negotiate a treaty of releasing the American prisoners. At first, the Bashaw demanded a sum of \$200,000 but it was reduced to \$60,000. On June 4th, 1805, the peace treaty was concluded between the United States and Tripoli. Shortly after signing the treaty, the United States withdrew its force from Derne and convinced Hamet Karamanli to leave Tripoli. Consequently, the prisoners were

⁵⁷ Todd, Charles Burr. "The Capture of Darne". Lippincott's, volume 29, J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1882, pp. 162-175. p.162

⁵⁸ Janssens 12

⁵⁹ Rodda, Chris. *Liars for Jesus: The Religious Right's Alternate Version of American History*. Rodda Company, Volume 1, 2006. p.304

released and peace was restored in Tripoli.⁶⁰ The first articles showed what the two states had agreed on:

Article I. "There shall be [...] universal peace, and a sincere friendship, between the President and citizens of the United States of America, on the one part, and the Bashaw, Bey, and subjects of the Regency of Tripoli, in Barbary[....].

Article II. " The Bashaw of Tripoli shall deliver up to the American squadron now off Tripoli all the Americans in his possession, and all the subjects of the Bashaw of Tripoli now in the power of the United States of America shall be delivered up to him[....] the Bashaw of Tripoli shall receive from the United States of America the sum of sixty thousand dollars, as a payment for the difference between the prisoners herein mentioned."

Article III. "All the forces of the United States which have been or may be in hostility against the Bashaw of Tripoli, in the province of Derne, or elsewhere within the dominions of the said Bashaw, shall be withdrawn [...] the Americans will use all means in their power to persuade the brother of the said Bashaw, [...] to withdraw from the territory of the said Bashaw of Tripoli....."⁶¹

⁶⁰ Frost, John. *The American Generals*. Hartford, Case, Tiffany and Company, 2015. p.165

⁶¹ Malloy, William. *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers 1776-1909*, Volume 2, Washington Government Printing Office, 1910. 1789.

A.5. Tunis' Agreement

Tunis also was regarded as a threat to the United States during the war of Tripoli when a Tunisian warship wanted to access the Tripolitan harbor on April 24th, 1805. Thus, the warship was captured by the American frigate the *Constitution*. In reaction to this, the Bey of Tunis, Hamuda, demanded his warship back otherwise he would declare war on the United States. In turn, Commodore John Rodgers feared assaults on American commerce, merchants and ships in the Mediterranean. So, he sent the frigate *Congress* and the brig *Vixen* to protect their interests near the Tunisian coast.⁶²

So as to overwhelm the Tunisian corsairs, Commodore Rodgers conducted a naval force consisting of the *Constitution*, *Constellation*, *Essex*, *John Adams*, *Syren*, *Franklin*, *Nautilus*, *Enterprise*, *Hornet*, and eight gunboats. Before engaging in war with Tunis, Commodore Rodgers chose Captain Stephen Decatur to inquire whether the Bey still wanted to wage a war or he changed his mind to make peace. Rodgers got no answer from the Bey. The latter sought to complain about his seized ship to the President in the United States himself by sending Soliman Mellimelli. After the envoy's arrival to the United States an agreement to pay Tunis \$10, 000, for her seized vessel was concluded and peace was restored in 1805.⁶³

At the whole, it can be deducted that the United States war with Tripoli was the first step for her to protect its ships and commerce in the Mediterranean Sea from the Barbary corsairs. However, this war would not stop piracy in the sea. So, the United States would have other fighting rounds with the other Barbary States especially Algiers in order to trade peacefully.

⁶² Tucker, Glenn 426.

⁶³ Cooper, J. Fenimore." Sketches of Naval Men, Edward Preble". Graham's Monthly Magazine. Volumes 26-27, Mezzotint and steel Engravings, Music, ETC,1845, pp. 265-276.p.270-271

B. The Second American- Barbary War 1815- 1816: The United States' Crises with Algiers

During the war of Tripoli between 1801 and 1805, the number of corsairs decreased in the Mediterranean Sea due to the American naval force's presence. However, the piracy activity soon returned to the waters when the United States began to withdraw some of its warships which led to the American merchants' ships to encounter harassments from other Barbary states especially Algiers.

Algiers started to be an annoyance for the United States when the former captured the brig *Friendship* on December 7th, 1805 because it did not have a valid passport, but the brig was released later.⁶⁴ Another attempt for the Algerian corsairs was on May 30th, 1806 when they attacked an American merchant ship and took all its valuable properties.⁶⁵

Considering the deals that were handled in the treaty of 1795 which stated that the United States had to pay \$21,600 annually, Algeria asked America to pay late fees for two previous years.⁶⁶ Unexpectedly, the United States assumed that she could not accept Algiers' demand which eventually led the Dey Achmet to order capturing any American ship in the Mediterranean Sea in November 1807.⁶⁷ As a result, Algiers' corsairs seized some American ships the *Eagle*, the *Violet*, the *Edwin*, *Sally* and the *Mary Ann* in addition to their cargos and captains.⁶⁸ The Dey Achmet decided to release the captives when the United States paid late fees otherwise he would declare war.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Wilson 286.

⁶⁵ Wilson 289.

⁶⁶ Woodward 601.

⁶⁷ Wilson 290.

⁶⁸ Wheelan 288. & Wilson 294-297.

⁶⁹ Paine 6.

On June 18th, 1812, the United States declared war on Britain.⁷⁰ The warlike situation did not prevent the United States from sending money and gifts to Algiers on July 17th, 1812. Dey Hadji Ali did not accept what the United States brought him stating that the few supplies were lesser than the payments owed to Algiers.⁷¹ To settle this problem, on July 25th, 1812, the United States borrowed \$27,000 from the financial Jewish House of Bakri to pay its tributes and protect her ships and merchants as well; however, the corsairs did not stop to ask for more.⁷²

By April 17th, 1815, Omar was appointed Dey of Algiers after the assassination of Dey Hadji and on the same date, the United States' war with Britain ended.⁷³ Few weeks later, the new Dey ordered to capture new American ships. This fact raged President James Madison who sought Congress' approval to declare war on Algiers. On May 2nd, Congress agreed on the President's proposal.⁷⁴

President Madison sought to send two squadrons at once to Algiers.⁷⁵ These squadrons were under the command of Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge. On June 15th, 1815, Decatur's fleet was the first to reach the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁶ His squadron consisted of many warships: the *Guerrière*, *Constellation*, *Macedonian*, *Epervier*, *Ontario*, *firefly*, *Spark*, *Flambeau*, *Torch* and *Spitfire*.⁷⁷

While crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, American ships noticed the presence of an Algerian warship. They attacked the forty-six gun Algerian warship which was under the command of Raïs Hamido. The warship had over 400 men. Most of the

⁷⁰ Ross 417.

⁷¹ Wilson 295.

⁷² Hirschberg, H.Z (J.W). *A History of the Jews in North Africa*. Volume 2, Leiden E.J. Brill, 1981..p.34

⁷³ Maameri 366.

⁷⁴ Wheelan 296.

⁷⁵ Null, Christopher R. *The Barbary Wars: Ideology and Politics in Post-Revolutionary America*. MA Thesis .University Of Alabama at Birmingham ,2008. Web. 08 Sept 2018..P.72

⁷⁶ Maameri 364.

⁷⁷ Fremont 76.

American warships surrounded the Algerian ship so as not to flee. The Algerian warship had been fired intensively until its crew surrendered. Thirty corsairs were killed and four hundred-six were seized. Decatur ordered to send the Algerian warship to Carthage.⁷⁸

In another attempt on June 19th, 1815, an American platoon, which consisted of some warships, chased another Algerian brig called *Estedio* which contained one hundred-eighty men and twenty two guns. After seizing this brig, eighty corsairs were captured and the others were murdered. The Algerian brig *Estedio* was sent to Carthage.⁷⁹

On June 28th, 1815, Decatur reached Algiers with his fleet. The United States' naval force proved to be more powerful than the Algerian corsairs.⁸⁰ Decatur advanced to the port of Algiers, asking the Dey to sign a new treaty on their terms, but Algeria insisted on getting their ships back before getting into any negotiations. After a long meeting with representatives from both states, the United States agreed to this condition and refused to pay further annual tributes.⁸¹ Articles One and Two of the Treaty of 1815 show the United States' conditions:

Article One: There shall be, [...] a firm, inviolable, and universal peace and friendship between the President and citizens of the United States of America on the one part, and the Dey and subjects of the Regency of Algiers, in Barbary[...].

Article Two: It is distinctly understood between the contracting parties, that no tribute, either as biennial presents, or under any other form or name whatever, shall

⁷⁸ Janssens 13.

⁷⁹ Wheelan 297.

⁸⁰ Fremont 76-77.

⁸¹ Bradford 180.

ever be required by the Dey and Regency of Algiers from the United States of America, on any pretext whatever.⁸²

Under William Bainbridge, the second squadron left Boston on 3rd, July and arrived to Algiers, then Tripoli and at last Tunis so as to show the American flag and confirm that the United States would no longer tolerate harassment. Bainbridge wanted to prove to the Barbary States that the United States would refuse to pay tributes and express her disapprobation to white slavery.⁸³

On December 23rd, 1816, President Madison appointed Commodore Isaac Chauncey to sign a peace treaty with the Dey of Algiers, and subsequently, the United States' complicated relations with the Barbary States ended.⁸⁴

⁸² Malloy 6-7.

⁸³ Fremont p.79

⁸⁴ Wilson 306-307.

General Conclusion

After the end of the whole wars, the United States relations with the Barbary States changed drastically. The Barbary States were no longer daring to ask for tributes, harass the American vessels in the Mediterranean Sea and capture American merchants to enslave them. These achievements could hardly be obtained and cost the United States to lose so many lives, yet, she could impose her supremacy over the Barbary States. The United States' supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea was due to the increasing strength of her naval force. Despite the fact that some Republicans before and during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson refused to finance the navy, the humiliation of paying tributes to the Barbary States urged them to spend huge sums of money so as to build a powerful one.

By creating a powerful naval force, the United States could threaten the Barbary States whose supremacy decreased. The United States could impose herself over the Barbary States and rejected all the demands of their leaders. In fact, the United States knew through her experience with Britain that power was the direct and the best way to achieve supremacy. Thus, the United States used force to overwhelm the Barbary States and she succeeded to achieve supremacy.

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